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# Effectiveness
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Cap reduces spam and abuse on websites and web apps. While it won't block _all_ spam (no CAPTCHA is a silver bullet), it significantly reduces it by making automated abuse costly. The core principle behind proof-of-work CAPTCHAs like Cap is **proving effort** rather than just verifying if you're human through interaction analysis or complex puzzles.
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When you verify yourself, Cap performs these steps:
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1. **Requesting challenges:** Asks the server for multiple unique challenges. Each includes a salt and a target difficulty. (Using multiple challenges helps adjust difficulty and track progress.)
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2. **Solving the challenges:** Uses Web Workers and WebAssembly on your device to quickly test a bunch of nonces, combining them with the challenge salt, checking if the resulting hash starts with the target.
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3. **Validating the challenges:** The widget sends the successful nonce solutions back to the server.
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4. **Redeeming the challenges:** If validation succeeds, the server issues a short-lived token that proves the work was done, granting access.
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Cap reduces spam and abuse on websites and web apps. While it won't block _all_ spam (no CAPTCHA is a silver bullet), it significantly reduces it by making automated abuse expensive. The core principle behind proof-of-work CAPTCHAs like Cap is **proving effort** rather than just verifying if you're human through fingerprinting or complex puzzles.
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## Privacy & security
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Cap prioritizes user privacy and is designed to be GDPR and CCPA compliant.
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Cap doesn't use cookies or telemetry by default. No data is collected or stored in our servers.
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- **No Tracking:** It doesn't use cookies or employ intrusive tracking methods.
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- **No Data Selling:** We never sell user data.
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- **Minimal Data:** We don't collect personal information beyond what's essential for the PoW process itself. No ads, no tracking, no telemetry. Period.
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- **IP Addresses:** Not stored by default.
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- **Challenge Storage:** Challenges exist only in memory on the server to prevent tampering and expire quickly (10 minutes by default).
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- **Token Storage:** Only hashed tokens are stored persistently (in `.data/tokensList.json` by default) to validate user sessions, and they also expire (20 minutes by default).
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By default, Cap's server library uses the following defaults:
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- **Challenge storage:** Challenges are only stored in memory on the server to prevent tampering and expire after 10 mins
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- **Token storage:** Only hashed tokens are stored persistently (in `.data/tokensList.json` by default) to validate user sessions, and they also expire (20 minutes by default).
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## Why Proof-of-work?
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Every CAPTCHA can eventually be solved, whether by sophisticated bots or humans paid via CAPTCHA farms. The crucial difference lies in the _cost_ imposed on attackers.
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Every CAPTCHA can eventually be solved, whether by AIs, algorithms or humans paid via CAPTCHA farms — this results in an endless cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders. The crucial difference lies in the _cost_ imposed on attackers.
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The goal is to make automated abuse expensive while keeping the experience fast and virtually invisible for real users. Proof-of-work is a perfect balance, stopping abuse by requiring computational effort rather than relying solely on human verification methods that bots continuously learn to mimic.
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Cap's goal is to make automated abuse expensive while keeping the experience fast and virtually invisible for real users. PoW is a perfect balance for this issue, stopping abuse by requiring computational effort rather than relying solely on human verification methods that bots continuously learn to mimic.
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**Example**: Imagine sending 10,000 spam messages costs $1, potentially earning $10 – a profitable venture. If Cap increases the computational cost so that sending those messages now costs $100, the spammer loses $90. This eliminates the financial incentive.
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Imagine sending 10,000 spam messages costs $1, potentially earning $10 – a profitable venture. If Cap increases the computational cost so that sending those messages now costs $100, the spammer loses $90. This eliminates the financial incentive.
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For a deeper dive into the technical aspects, you might find [this research paper](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374638786_Proof-of-Work_CAPTCHA_with_password_cracking_functionality) useful.
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